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**HOMELAND SECURITY:
A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Homeland Security: A Canadian Perspective

by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel J.J. Selbie

TITLE: Homeland Security: A Canadian Perspective

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 18 April 2001 PAGES: 43 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

At the turn of the century, the attention of the U.S. security establishment has been drawn to the consideration of non-traditional and asymmetric threats to the continental United States. Consequently, there have been calls for the development of new strategies and structures aimed at assuring the defence of the "homeland". Several measures have been undertaken. Others are contemplated. Given the circumstances of North American geography and the nature of its relationship with its southern neighbour, this issue and these actions are of great interest to Canada. This paper examines the Canadian security environment with a view to determining to what extent such threats confront Canada. It concludes that significant threats – while perhaps less acute in certain dimensions – do indeed exist. What then is Canada's policy? What should it be? To answer these questions, this essay proposes an ends, ways and means based Canadian homeland security strategy.

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HOMELAND SECURITY: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire. We can assure each other that this hemisphere, at least, shall remain a strong citadel wherein civilization can flourish unimpaired.

— President Franklin Roosevelt, 1938

We, too, have our obligations as a good friendly neighbour, and one of them is to see that, at our instance, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces would not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States, across Canadian territory.

—Prime Minister W.L Mackenzie King 1938

On 26 February 1993, Islamic militants seeking to avenge U.S. support for Israel and to protest U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East detonated a car bomb in the basement of New York City's World Trade Center. The blast and resulting fire killed six people and injured more than 1,000 others.¹ On 20 March 1995, a Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway killed twelve and sent thousands to hospital.² On 19 April 1995, a truck bomb exploded in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City blowing off the front side of the nine story structure and killing 168 men, women and children in the worst ever terrorist attack on U.S. soil.³ On 14 December 1999, Ahmed Ressam, an alleged member of an Algerian terrorist group with supposed links to Osama bin Laden, traveling to Seattle under an assumed name with a fraudulently obtained Canadian passport, was arrested at the Canada-U.S. border at the wheel of a car packed with bomb making material.⁴ A Montreal teenager nicknamed "Mafiaboy", recently pleaded guilty to 56 charges related to a February 2000 computer network attack on major U.S. Internet sites that caused an estimated \$1.5 billion in damages.⁵ North Korea and Iran, amongst other states of concern, are reported to be pursuing the development of ballistic missiles capable of inter-continental range.⁶ An outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the United Kingdom in the spring of 2001 has already caused losses reported to be in excess of £1.0 billion and yet shows no sign of being brought under control.⁷

The vulnerabilities, capabilities and intentions demonstrated by events such as these have given rise to an intense debate amongst members of the U.S. security establishment. Central to this discourse have been efforts to assess the potency of so-called non-traditional or

asymmetric threats to the safety of the citizenry and the integrity of the critical infrastructure of the United States and to articulate new strategies and structures aimed at assuring the "defense" or the "security" of the "homeland". Several measures have been taken. Others are contemplated. Given the circumstances of North American geography – an undefended border more than 5000 kilometers long is shared by Canada and the U.S. – and the transcendent nature of Canada's diplomatic, economic, informational and military relationship with its southern neighbor, this issue and these actions are of great interest to the Dominion. To what extent do missile attacks, terrorism - perhaps involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, malicious disruption or damage of critical national infrastructure, transnational criminal activity; and the like, pose a threat to Canada? Should viable threats exist, how should Canada respond? What might constitute a Canadian homeland security strategy? This paper attempts to answer these questions.

THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE

Before turning to the Canadian situation, let us trace the progress of the homeland defense/security issue in the U.S. and attempt to form a judgment as to present and future policy.

Arguably, it was the death and devastation wrought by the Oklahoma City bombing, occurring as it did so soon after the Tokyo nerve gas incident, that focused U.S. national attention on the issue of the country's post-Cold War vulnerability to attack - be it from without or within. Consequently, the tragedy also served to prompt the succession of executive directives, legislation and investigative commissions that have informed the "homeland defense" debate up to the present.

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 39

Within two months of the bombing, in June 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 - an enunciation of his administration's counter-terrorism policy. PDD 39 stipulated a number of measures intended to reduce U.S. vulnerability to terrorism; to deter or respond to terrorist acts; and to strengthen its ability to prevent or manage the consequences of the terrorist use of unconventional weapons. It further distinguished "crisis management" – those measures aimed at anticipating, preventing and/or resolving a threat or act of terrorism, from "consequence management" – those measures aimed at protecting public health and safety; restoring essential government services; and providing emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The Directive named the FBI as the agency responsible for domestic "crisis management" while the

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was given the lead for "consequence management". Other federal departments and agencies were assigned supporting roles. A Terrorism Incident Annex reflecting these policies provisions was added to the Federal Response Plan maintained by FEMA.⁸

DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ACT

In 1996, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for 1997) was passed by Congress obliging federal departments and agencies to execute programs and activities aimed at enhancing the capability of Federal, State and Local "emergency responders" to deal with terrorist incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).⁹

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

In that same year, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was established. Its task was to ascertain the vulnerability of critical infrastructure (defined as telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil production, storage and transportation facilities, banking and finance institutions, transportation systems, emergency and continuity of government services) to physical and "cyber" threats and, to suggest a strategy for its protection. In its 1997 report, the Commission described the nation's "life support systems" as being increasingly dependent on "information and communications systems that criss-cross the nation and span the globe." "This dependence", the Commission's Chairman, Robert Marsh, wrote, "is the source of rising vulnerabilities and, therefore, it is where we concentrated our effort."¹⁰ While the Commission found no evidence of an impending "cyber-attack" which could have a debilitating effect on critical infrastructure, it did identify the existence of a widespread capability to exploit infrastructure vulnerabilities. "The capability to do harm – particularly through information networks – is real; it is growing at an alarming rate; and we have little defense against it."¹¹ Moreover, the commissioners found that the public in general and many industry and government leaders were insufficiently aware of these vulnerabilities. As a response, the Commission recommended, *inter alia*, a strategy of "infrastructure protection through industry cooperation and information sharing" focused on the promotion and adoption of best practices in each sector and facilitated by a private-public sector/federal, state and local organizational structure.¹²

1997 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the danger to U.S. forces of asymmetric threats - those tactics and strategies that seek to circumvent or undermine an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses – often employing a very small effort that yields dramatic results. The Review committed to the provision of “increased focus and funding to countering such threats.”¹³

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL

The National Defense Panel (NDP), tasked to examine long-term U.S. security and defense issues in conjunction with the Quadrennial Defense Review, was the first of the policy review groups to use the term “homeland defense”. Its report to Secretary of Defense Cohen maintained, “protecting the territory of the United States and its citizens from “all enemies both foreign and domestic” is the principal task of government.”¹⁴ Sixty years after Pearl Harbor and ten years after the end of the Cold War, the Panel suggested that a major shift in type and degree of threat had returned “homeland defense” to center stage in national security planning. The need to deter a strategic nuclear attack endured. Additionally, the U.S. had now to cope with a multiplicity of potential state and non-state adversaries with access to the technology of weapons of mass destruction, casualties or disruption; the means to fabricate and deliver such weapons; and, a growing willingness to employ or threaten to employ them, against targets on U.S. soil, as part of an asymmetric strategy for achieving their objectives.

Pointing to the “apparent ease of infiltration” of the nation’s borders by “drug smugglers, illegal immigrants and contraband goods” as a “potentially significant problem” in that it suggested that terrorists could also infiltrate with little difficulty, the Panel suggested that “coastal and border defense of the homeland is a challenge that again deserves serious thought.”¹⁵

Another important contribution by the NDP was its observation that in many mission areas, the military would play a supporting role behind local law enforcement agencies and a host of other federal, state and local entities. The localized nature of many “consequence management” activities suggested too, that the National Guard and the Army Reserve would lead the military’s support efforts.¹⁶

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The National Military Strategy issued in 1997 also recognized the asymmetric challenge and the need to “increase our capabilities to counter these threats and adopt our military

doctrine, training and equipment to ensure a rapid and effective joint and inter-agency response.”¹⁷

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 62

Presidential Decision Directive 62 (Combating Terrorism), issued in May 1998, expanded and focused the measures contained in PDD 39 with a view to creating a “more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century.” To this end, it clarified federal agency responsibilities for counter-terrorism program activities ranging from the apprehension and prosecution of terrorists through incident response capabilities to the protection of the “computer based systems that lie at the heart of America’s economy.” It also established the office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism within the National Security Council.¹⁸

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 63

Presidential Decision Directive 63 (Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure) also issued in May 1998, was based on the recommendations of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). It tasked the National Coordinator Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism with the implementation of a number of initiatives. These included improved inter-agency coordination for CIP; the establishment of departmental Chief Information Officers within the federal government with responsibility for information assurance; the creation of a National Infrastructure Protection Center within the FBI; and, the promotion of partnerships with the private sector aimed at enhancing computer security.¹⁹

THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States commenced its deliberations in 1997 under the Chairmanship of Donald Rumsfeld. The Commissioners found that:

- All of the nations identified as developing long range ballistic missiles have the option to arm these, as well as their shorter range systems with biological or chemical weapons
- The knowledge needed to design and build a nuclear weapon is now widespread.
- Nations about which the U.S. has reason to be concerned are exploiting a dramatically transformed international security environment. That environment provides ever-widening access to technology, information and expertise that can be and is used to

speed both the development and deployment of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

- A number of countries with regional ambitions do not welcome the U.S. role as a stabilizing power in their regions and have not accepted it passively. Because of their ambitions, they want to place restraints on the U.S. capability to project power or influence into their regions. They see the acquisition of missile and WMD technology as a way of doing so.
- Since the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical environment and the roles of ballistic missiles and WMD have both evolved. Ballistic missiles provide a cost-effective delivery system that can be used for both conventional and non-conventional weapons. For those seeking to thwart the projection of U.S. power, the capability to combine ballistic missiles with WMD provides a strategic counter to U.S. conventional and information-based military superiority. With such weapons, these nations can pose a serious threat to the United States.
- Whether short or long-range, a successfully launched ballistic missile has a high probability of delivering its payload to its target compared to other means of delivery. Emerging powers therefore see ballistic missiles as highly effective deterrent weapons and as an effective means of coercing or intimidating adversaries, including the U.S.²⁰

In its report, submitted in July 1998, the Commissioners concluded:

- Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States. These newer, developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in addition to those still posed by the existing nuclear arsenals of Russia and China. The newer ballistic missile-equipped nations' capabilities will not match those of U.S. systems for accuracy or reliability. However, they would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (ten years in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made.
- The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been previously reported.
- The Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is eroding.

- The warning times the U.S. can expect of new threatening ballistic missile deployments are being reduced. Under some plausible scenarios, the U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment.
- The Commissioners recommended that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which they may be little or no warning before operational deployment.²¹

This report provided strong incentive for the further development and deployment of ballistic missile defence systems.

THE ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The so-called “Gilmore Panel” named for its chairman, James Gilmore, was charged in 1999 with assessing the progress made by the U.S. in its efforts to strengthen its capability to respond to terrorist incidents involving CBRN weapons.²² Turning its attention first to the supposed threat, the Panel, while confirming the reality of a CBRN terrorist threat, took pains to underline the considerable difficulties associated with the acquisition or fabrication, testing, transportation and employment of such devices by terrorist groups. As such, it urged a balance be maintained between preparing for unprecedented higher-consequence but less likely attack, and lower consequence but more frequent attacks using conventional explosives.²³

Reporting in December 2000, the Panel concluded most significantly that the U.S. had no “coherent, functional national strategy for combating terrorism” and that the organization of the Federal government’s programs for combating terrorism is “fragmented, uncoordinated, and politically unaccountable.”²⁴ It recommended that the incoming President should develop and present to Congress a national strategy for combating terrorism within one year of assuming office.²⁵ This strategy, the Panel argued, should be national not just federal in scope and incorporate the full range of deterrence, prevention, preparedness and response measures across the complete domestic and international terrorist threat spectrum including cyber- and agro-terrorism. To oversee the development and implementation of this strategy, the Panel recommended the establishment, on a statutory basis, of a National Office for Combating Terrorism within the Executive Office of the President. The Panel’s belief that the incumbent’s terms of reference emphasize the preservation of civil liberties in a time of emergency is of special note in connection with this proposal.²⁶

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The 2000 National Security Strategy released by President Clinton in December 1999 identifies potential enemies, whether nations or terrorists, as being more likely in the future to resort to attacks against vulnerable civilian targets in the United States. It points out that easier access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive power available to adversaries of whatever stripe is greater than ever. Long-range ballistic missiles or unconventional tools, such as WMD, financial destabilization, or information attacks, all might be used to threaten American citizens and critical infrastructure on U.S. territory.

It declares, "The United States will act to deter or prevent such attacks and, if attacks occur despite those efforts, will be prepared to defend against them, limit the damage they cause, and respond effectively against the perpetrators."²⁷ The NSS goes on to describe specific positions and measures with respect to "National Missile Defense (NMD)", "Countering Foreign Intelligence Collection", "Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction", "Critical Infrastructure Protection" and "National Security Emergency Preparedness".

2000 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS – SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

In his 2000 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, the Secretary of Defense, in addition to other aspects of the military's response in the face of asymmetric threats, sets out four principles intended to govern Department of Defense (DoD) participation in the Federal Response Plan. First, DoD will ensure an unequivocal chain of responsibility, authority and accountability for its actions to assure the American people that the military will follow the basic constructs of lawful action when an emergency occurs. Second, DoD will always play a supporting role to the FBI and FEMA and will act in complete compliance with the Constitution, the *Posse Comitatus Act* (which generally precludes the Active Component of the Armed Services from acting in a law enforcement role within the United States) and other applicable laws. Third, DoD will purchase equipment and provide support in areas that are largely related to its war-fighting mission. Many capabilities are, however, of dual-use. Units specializing in decontamination, medical support, logistics and communications are well suited to this purpose. Finally, Reserve and National Guard Units are considered forward deployed for domestic consequence management with the United States Joint Forces Command's Joint Task Force Civil Support assuming overall responsibility for coordinating DoD's consequence management support to civil authorities for large-scale emergencies within the U.S.²⁸

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY

Possibly the best indication of the future direction of the homeland security issue in the U.S. is found in the Phase III Report of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. The mandate of this high-level Commission (known also as the Hart-Rudman Commission after its co-chairmen) was very broad. The Secretary of Defense chartered the Commission in 1999 to conduct a comprehensive review of the 21st Century global security environment; develop a national security strategy appropriate to that environment; and, recommend changes to the national security apparatus necessary for the implementation of the strategy. The Commission conducted its work in three phases. Phase I was dedicated to gaining an understanding of how the world will likely evolve over the next 25 years. In Phase II, a U.S. national security strategy was devised to deal with that world. In the third and final phase, reforms to government processes and structures necessary for the implementation of this strategy were identified.²⁹

Proposals for organizational change contained in the Phase III Report, released in February 2001, touched on five key areas: "ensuring the security of the American homeland; recapitalizing America's strengths in science and technology; redesigning key institutions of the Executive Branch; overhauling the U.S. government's military and civilian personnel systems; and reorganizing Congress's role in national security affairs."³⁰

The conclusions of the Commission in the realm of homeland security echo the findings of the National Security Panel and of the Marsh, Rumsfeld, and Gillmore studies. Similarly, its recommendations reinforce those made by its predecessors. Both are worthy of summary here.

Regarding the threat, the Commission concluded that the combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism would end the relative post-Cold War invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. Consequently, attacks against American citizens on American soil, possibly causing heavy casualties, are likely over the next quarter century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine U.S. global leadership. These attacks may involve weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass disruption. This is because both the technical means for such attacks, and the array of actors who might use such means are proliferating despite the best efforts of American diplomacy. As porous as U.S. physical borders are in an age of burgeoning trade and travel, its "cyber-borders" are even more porous. Non-state and state actors alike can now target the critical infrastructure upon which so much of the U.S. economy depends. America's present global predominance does not render it immune from these dangers. To the

contrary, U.S. pre-eminence makes the American homeland more appealing as a target, while America's openness and freedoms make it more vulnerable.³¹

The Commission further concluded that, in the face of this threat, the U.S. has neither adopted homeland security as a primary national security mission nor developed a coherent defensive strategy. Moreover, the national security apparatus is poorly organized to design and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the homeland. Finally, the assets and structures that now exist for homeland security are scattered across more than two-dozen departments and agencies and all fifty states.³²

Broadly, the Commissioners recommended:

- The security of the American homeland be *the* primary national security mission of the U.S. government.
- The President both develop a comprehensive strategy and propose new organizational structures to prevent and protect against attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection should fail.
- In view of the large scale of the scenarios envisioned, the government be prepared to use effectively – albeit with all proper safeguards – the extensive resources of the Department of Defense noting that this will necessitate new priorities for the U.S. Armed Forces and particularly for the National Guard.
- Legislative guidance for planning among federal agencies and state and local authorities take particular cognizance of the role of the military, specifically, that its subordination to civil authority in this role be clearly defined.
- Congress exercise careful oversight in this realm with a view to guaranteeing that homeland security is achieved within a framework of law that protects the civil liberties and privacy of American citizens.³³

Concerning a strategic framework for homeland security policy and plans, the Commissioners recommended a strategy of layered defense focusing first on prevention, second on protection, and third on response. A key element of prevention would be the application of the diplomatic element of power with a view to avoiding, diffusing or resolving issues before they give rise to threats or actual attacks. Intelligence assets would be deployed abroad in order to provide maximum early warning and offer the opportunity to disrupt attack preparations. The Commissioners were strongly in favour of beefing up border security and surveillance to prevent agents of attack who are not detected and stopped overseas from actually entering the U.S. Enhanced cyber-security would be founded on greater public awareness and better tools to detect and diagnose intrusions. Finally, under the heading of

prevention it would be vital to deter attacks through the maintenance of long-range strike capabilities and by making clear to the world U.S. determination to use military force in a pre-emptive fashion if necessary.

With respect to protection, the Commissioners urged the development of an integrated territorial surveillance system; expressed their belief that a Ballistic Missile defense system would be a useful addition and should be developed to the extent technically feasible, fiscally prudent and politically sustainable; and, suggested that defenses should also be pursued against Cruise Missiles. Early warning and detection in combination with accurate attack assessments are identified as crucial to critical infrastructure protection along with advanced systems for halting attacks, establishing back-ups and restoring service.

The key to effective response lies at the state and local levels and so the Commissioners argue in favour of building up and augmenting as required local response capabilities by means of the provision of adequate equipment and training, the nation-wide dissemination of standard operating procedures and the frequent conduct of training exercises. The maintenance of an interoperable, robust and redundant communications ability and the continuity of government and critical services would also be fundamental to effective response to an attack. Demonstrating effective responses to natural and manmade disasters will help build mutual confidence and relationships among those roles in dealing with a major terrorist attack³⁴

The Commissioners also made specific proposals with respect to organizational realignment:

- The creation of an independent National Homeland Security Agency based on FEMA with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security to include the Customs Service, the Border Patrol and the Coast Guard.
- New Office of Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security to be created to oversee DoD activities in this domain and to ensure that the necessary resources are made available.
- The National Guard be given homeland security as a primary mission and be reorganized, trained and equipped to undertake that mission.
- Congress should form a special select committee for homeland security to provide Congressional support and oversight in this critical area.³⁵

ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE

The conclusions and recommendations of the aforementioned panels and commissions in conjunction with the policy pronouncements and actions of the Clinton Administration make it

plain that the U.S. perceives as real and worthy of response, the threat of direct attack on its citizens or its vital infrastructure by means, possibly, of weapons of mass destruction, mass disruption or mass casualties. While the challenges facing potential adversaries in mounting an assault on the U.S. homeland should not be underestimated, the difficulties associated with the fashioning of an effective defence against attacks of this nature are also formidable. Certainly, the cost of building an effective defence against missile attack, of securing borders against terrorist infiltration or of generating the capability of alleviating the effects of a successful biological weapon attack will be very high in terms of the technology, capital and human resources required. To this bill, must be added the dangers posed to privacy rights and individual liberties by the extent of domestic surveillance and intelligence gathering activities that might be required to come to grips with a terrorist threat. One might ask what priority should be attached to this threat relative to continuing threats to overseas interests? Will the President and the Congress accept the Hart-Rudman Commission's recommendation that "homeland security" become the primary national security mission of the U.S. government? Definitive answers to these questions must await the report of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. It seems likely, however, that at the very least, the Bush administration will attempt to fashion a more comprehensive homeland security strategy and make many of the organizational changes proposed by Hart-Rudman. A strong argument can be made that the Canadian government should act in a similar vein.

THE CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE

Canadian policy-makers would do well to study the reports of the Hart-Rudman Commission and its predecessors. For although they may not be as direct or as pervasive from a Canadian perspective as from an American, the threats exposed by these reports also confront Canada and are similarly deserving of a response. The specific character of both threat and the policy response will, of course, be shaped by Canada's position in the world, its national character, values and interests and its own particular assessment of identifiable threats

CANADA'S POSITION IN THE WORLD

Its climate notwithstanding, Canada occupies a privileged position in the world. Its 31 million people occupy the second largest country in the world – a land blessed with an abundance of natural resources including huge reserves of oil, natural gas and fresh water. Its increasingly high-technology manufacturing and services based economy is the eighth largest in the world. Seven years running, it has topped the United Nations Human Development Index – a gauge of quality of life based on education, health and income.

Canada's geographic location allows it access to Europe, Asia, Latin America and, of course, the world's richest single market – the United States. Its cultural heritage provides it a privileged entrée to the Anglophone and Francophone worlds as well as to the homelands of Canadians drawn from every part of the globe who make up its multicultural personality. It is a member of all leading world organizations including the UN, NATO, G8, APEC, OAS, The Commonwealth and *la Francophonie*. Canada maintains a modest military establishment. It has been a leading participant in UN mandated peacekeeping operations and was a member of both the Gulf and Kosovo peace enforcement coalitions. Fundamentally, Canada remains a self-professed middle power inclined toward constructive multi-lateralism and the mediation of conflict.

NATIONAL CHARACTER

Canadians often term their country, "the peaceable Kingdom". This remains an apt description although when rallied to a cause, Canadians display a remarkably determined warrior spirit as was demonstrated in two World Wars and the Korean conflict. Canada's is a peaceful society, one that places great value on the principle and reality of moderation and order. Canadians have developed a political system that does better than many to absorb and accommodate difference. Canada does not have a history of colonial exploitation or empire nor is it a superpower or even a great power, which by their very natures acquire enemies. Canada is seen by most in the world as a moderate country. It is distant from, and not a party to, regional and ethnic conflicts. Canadian Senator Raoul Dandurand's declaration at the League of Nations Assembly in 1924 continues to ring true in the ears of many today: "We live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials."³⁶ While distance is less and less an inhibiting factor, it is still relevant.

Ward Elcock, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service has pointed out that while distance from conflict and moderation in policies may make Canada less likely than others to be a target, we also, for the very same reasons, can be seen as a haven that might be safer than others. Canada's borders and coastline are long and comparatively permeable. It uniquely among developed countries exists alongside the United States - one of the world's pre-eminent terrorist targets. The nature of Canadian society and the related policies concerning refugees and immigrants make it particularly vulnerable to terrorist influence and activities. As with other democracies, openness and respect for human rights and freedoms limit the ability of the state to suppress terrorism in a ruthless, repressive fashion. Because of this, Canada and Canadians are currently standing into danger.³⁷

VALUES AND INTERESTS

Nowhere is there to be found an official compendium of Canadian values. That said, most observers of Canadian political and social behaviour would likely agree with a list that included the following:

- Democracy and the Rule of Law
- Respect for Human Rights & Freedoms
- (Reasonably) Free Market Economics
- “Peace, Order and Good Government”
- Tolerance and Compromise

Similarly, national interests are a matter of inference. A close reading of government policies would suggest that the following endure:

- Unity, Independence & Sovereignty
- Safety, Security and Well-being of Citizens, Infrastructure and the Natural Environment
- Economic Prosperity.
- Social Justice
- International Peace and Stability

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES

Any examination of Canadian security policy must take into account Canada's relationship with the United States. The U.S. is Canada's most important ally. The two countries maintain a relationship that is as close, complex, and extensive as any in the world. Ninety percent of Canadians live within 160 kilometers of the U.S. border. The border itself, undefended and crossed annually 200 million times, is evidence of the common political, economic, social and cultural values Canada and the U.S. share as advanced industrial democracies.³⁸

Canada and the U.S. are partners in the world's largest bilateral trading relationship. Each is the other's best customer with some 23% of U.S. exports flowing northward and over 80% of Canadian exports heading south.³⁹ Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, this economic link continues to strengthen. A continental energy grid has recently been proposed. Should it be implemented, the full integration of the economic infrastructure of the two countries will be virtually complete. For both countries, but particularly for Canada, reasonably free and unfettered access to the other's markets and resources is a vital interest.

Geography, history, trust and shared values have made the two countries partners in the defence of North America. The Ogdensburg Agreement, signed by President Franklin

Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1940, acknowledged the indivisible nature of continental security and pledged mutual assistance in the event of hostilities. In the years since, it has been augmented by over eighty treaty level defence agreements, more than 250 memoranda of understanding between the two defence departments and approximately 145 bilateral fora in which defence matters are discussed.⁴⁰ The Canadian Government's 1994 Defence White Paper re-affirmed the primacy of Canada-U.S. defence cooperation noting that this cooperation continues to serve Canada's fundamental interests. It also noted that were Canada to reduce significantly the level of defence cooperation, it would still be obliged to rely upon the U.S. to assist in protecting Canadian territory and approaches with such assistance coming strictly on American terms.⁴¹ At the height of the Cold War, Canada occupied the vital ground between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The U.S. had to rely on radars located in Canada to provide for warning of attack. Satellite technology has rendered such systems less critical. Today, Canadian territory is no longer a strategic necessity for the defence of the continental United States. For the U.S., the rationale for close defence and security cooperation with Canada is shifting from one of necessity to one of preference. However, while strategic circumstances have changed, it is still important from a U.S. point of view that Canada not become a base of operations for any hostile entity.

THREATS TO THE CANADIAN HOMELAND

A common formula for gauging security is:

$$\text{Threat} = \text{Capability} \times \text{Intention} \times \text{Vulnerability}$$

In the case of homeland security, this equation is made more complex due to the numerous variations attached to the factors. Is the threat internal or external in origin? Are the perpetrators state or non-state actors? What is the principal nature of the threat: political, military, economic, environmental, informational, cultural, social?

What is the target: the security forces, infrastructure, population centers, the environment or perhaps the will of the nation? What kind of weapon is utilized: conventional, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or cyber? Finally, is the threat direct or indirect? For the purposes of this paper, let us set aside purely political threats to Canada (eg, Quebec secessionism) as well as economic, cultural, social and environmental and focus instead on those direct threats that entail threats to human life or the destruction or disruption of critical infrastructure; essentially missile attack, terrorism, cyber-attack and transnational crime. There

are also two indirect threats of special relevance to Canada's situation that need to be considered.

Missile Attack

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) assesses that outside of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, with their long-standing programs, no state of ballistic missile proliferation concern is currently capable of targeting Canada directly from its homeland. However, Canadian troops serving in peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, as well as other Canadian citizens abroad, may be at risk of ballistic missile attack in various regions of the world. As delivery ranges increase, some of Canada's allies are being rendered vulnerable to such attacks against their home territories. In the longer term, a few states (eg, North Korea) potentially hostile to Canada's interests could acquire the capability, already possessed by Russia and China, to strike Canada directly with ballistic missiles. CSIS also takes note of alternative means possibly available in the future to less technologically developed states seeking to attack distant targets with WMD. These include shorter range ballistic missiles launched from forward deployed ships; land attack cruise missiles launched from aircraft and ships (commercial as well as military); and non-missile means (ie, covert delivery by ship, air or land). In terms of capability and of vulnerability, the conclusions of the Rumsfeld Commission are likely also applicable to Canada. The question of intent remains. As a middle-ranking ranking power of moderate outlook, even when a member of a war-fighting coalition as in the Gulf War or in Kosovo, Canada tends not to attract the enmity of the adversary to the extent the larger powers do. Hence, it is unlikely that Canada would be viewed as a prime target for a rogue state possessing a limited number of weapons or delivery means. There remains the possibility of a missile attack or the threat of an attack aimed at coercing Canada with a view to eroding the cohesion or capability of an alliance or coalition. Arguably though, a coalition member situated in the theatre of operations, possibly a host-nation, would make a more attractive target in this regard.⁴²

Cyber-Attack

CSIS has no evidence of a major cyber-attack against Canadian Critical infrastructure however there have been a number of minor incidents reported.⁴³ This said, the vulnerabilities described by the Marsh commission almost certainly apply equally to Canada.

Terrorism

Domestic terrorism, defined as the use of violence in support of a political objective, is rare, but not unknown, in Canada. Throughout the 1960s, culminating in the October Crisis of 1970, the "Front de Liberation du Quebec" (FLQ), pursued a limited campaign of robberies, bombings and, eventually, political kidnapping and murder in support of the Quebec secessionist movement. While the political movement persists, the FLQ and others who would use violence to attain their goals disappeared or were marginalized long ago.

Today, according to CSIS, the domestic terrorist threat emanates from extremists on the right and left of the political spectrum be they neo-nazis, white supremacists, militant environmentalists or virulent "anti-capitalists". The U.S. "militia movement" while not yet established in Canada has endeavoured to expand northward – an arms cache belonging to an American group having recently been discovered in British Columbia.

CSIS also monitors the threat posed by so-called "Doomsday Religious Movements" of the sort represented by the Branch Davidians in the U.S., the Aum Shinrykio group in Japan or Canada's Order of the Solar Temple who choose to assert their apocalyptic beliefs through violence. The demonstrated willingness of Aum Shinrykio to use a chemical mass casualty weapon against civilians underlines the threat posed by such groups who give the appearance of being less predictable, less rational and less restrained than conventionally politically motivated groups.

In a recent report on the subject of global CBRN Terrorism, CSIS concluded that "although it is impossible to estimate the precise likelihood of a mass-causality terrorist attack using CBRN materials, the technical obstacles are by no means insuperable and it appears to be a case not of if, but rather when, the next such event will occur." Based on recent examples, CSIS believes that the type of CBRN terrorist incident most likely to be experienced by Canada in future is a hoax or threat rather than an actual attack, or a relatively low-level instance of product contamination rather than a mass-casualty outrage.⁴⁴ This prediction has been borne out in recent months with packages purportedly containing bio-toxins arriving in the mail at the office of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in Ottawa and at a provincial government office in Toronto. In both cases, hundreds of employees were evacuated from the buildings affected and operations shut down until authorities were able to prove the material harmless.⁴⁵

At present, of greater concern to the Canadian security establishment than domestic terrorism or the potential of CBRN terrorism is the presence of international terrorist groups operating from within Canada. In his submission to the Canadian Senate's Committee on

Security and Intelligence in June 1998, Ward Elcock, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service stated:

"With perhaps the singular exception of the United States, there are more international terrorist groups active here than any other country in the world. The Counter-Terrorism Branch of CSIS is currently investigating over 50 organizational targets and about 350 individual terrorist targets. Terrorist groups are present here whose origins lie in virtually every regional, ethnic and nationalist conflict there is: the Punjab; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Egyptian; Algerian and Sudanese unrest; Lebanon; Turkey; Northern Ireland; Sri Lanka; the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan."⁴⁶

He went on to explain that the vast majority of terrorist activities in Canada relate to the support of actions elsewhere that are linked to homeland conflicts. These activities include: the provision of logistic support for terrorist acts; fund-raising in aid of terrorism; provision of safe haven; and the smuggling of individuals in and out of Canada including to and from the U.S. He also indicated that individuals and groups resident in Canada had had direct or indirect association with: the World Trade Center bombing, suicide assassination bombings in India, the Hobart Towers attack in Saudi Arabia and the bombing campaign of the Provisional IRA. The very real danger that this situation poses, according to Mr. Lock, is that Canada will gain a reputation as an unofficial state sponsor of terrorism and that we may find our sovereignty violated by state agencies from other parts of the world conducting their own counter-terrorism programmers inside Canada possibly in ways Canadians would find abhorrent.⁴⁷

Transnational Crime

CSIS estimates there are from five to 18 active transnational criminal organizations represented in Canada including Asian triads, Columbian cartels, Italian Mafia groups, Russian/Eastern European *mafias*, Nigerian crime groups and major outlaw motorcycle gangs. Their activities include drug trafficking; illegal migration; money laundering; illegal trade in hazardous wastes and ozone depleting substances. Most, if not all of these organizations, are active on both sides of the border.⁴⁸

Indirect Threats

The most compelling argument in favour of a more deliberate and determined homeland security effort is generated by what might be considered "indirect threats".

The first of these is the spillover effect of attacks on the U.S. An electro-magnetic pulse generated by a high altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon (HEMP) or other major computer network attack would likely produce equally catastrophic results in Canada as in the U.S. regardless of the fact that the former was not specifically targeted. Similarly, the effects of a

nuclear device detonation in Detroit or Buffalo or the deadly infection by agro-terrorists of livestock or foodstuffs would not respect border formalities.

The second indirect threat is that posed by the adoption by the U.S. of policy adverse to Canadian interests resulting from Canadian action or inaction, real or perceived, having the effect of, again actually or perceptually, posing a threat or increasing the potency of one already in existence. For instance, the imposition of a visa requirement on Canadians crossing into the U.S. following an attack by terrorists operating from a base in Canada would have a greatly negative impact on the Canadian economy.

Another example might be a U.S. decision to cancel the North American Aerospace Defence agreement as a result of Canadian abstention from participation in or support for the National Missile Defence program.

CURRENT CANADIAN POLICY

As in the U.S. there is at present no comprehensive, coherent federal government policy pertaining to the issues associated with homeland security. The Solicitor-General is the Minister of the Crown responsible for national security issues. His department includes CSIS, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Corrections Service of Canada. While CSIS and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) obviously play vital roles in this area, other agencies in a variety of departments from Justice to Agriculture are also deeply involved. Of course, Canada being one of the world's most decentralized federations, the provinces bear a large portion of the responsibility and authority for security issues as do local governments vis-à-vis critical infrastructure and consequence management.

This fragmentation does not mean that nothing is being done. The national emergency preparedness network is regularly put to the test due to the prevalence of floods, ice storms, forest fires and the like. Individual departments seem to be well aware of many homeland security issues and are acting on this knowledge. For instance, a national Critical Infrastructure Protection Office was established in March of 2001.⁴⁹ The RCMP was recently provided with an extra \$250 million to battle organized crime.⁵⁰ The federal Minister of Justice this year introduced legislation to Parliament that will also assist police in their battle with transnational criminals and international terrorist organizations.⁵¹ Changes to the Immigration Act intended to make it more difficult for criminals to enter or stay Canada are underway.⁵² Canadian customs and immigration authorities have made great progress in recent years in cooperating more closely with their U.S. counterparts.⁵³

Still there is a lack of coordination and situational awareness. The absence of a single overarching national security strategy and document that incorporates internal security as well as defense and foreign policy is the reason why, according to one well respected observer, "Canada's security operations at home and abroad in the last few years often seemed chaotic."

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WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

Three initiatives are called for: first, the production of a Canadian National Security Strategy on the U.S. model; second, the creation of a governmental structure to oversee the production and implementation of the NSS; and third, the design of a specific strategy subordinate to the NSS aimed at homeland security.

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Canada could do worse than emulate the National Security Strategy (NSS) model offered by the U.S. Produced in accordance with an Act of Congress by each incoming presidential administration and revised annually, the NSS articulates and prioritizes national values and interests; appraises current trends, threats and opportunities in the security environment; establishes national objectives; and describes the ways in which these objectives will be pursued and attained. The strategy also musters the means required to achieve the ends in the ways proposed. In the Canadian instance, an NSS would serve as an authoritative source document for statements of foreign and defence policy as well as those aspects of internal security policy that are within the purview of the federal government.

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

Currently, three committees of the federal cabinet exist to approve and coordinate government policy. These are the Economic Union Committee of Cabinet, the Social Union Committee of Cabinet and the Government Communications Committee. A fourth committee, the National Security Committee should be created consisting of those Ministers holding responsibility for the departments and agencies with leading security roles. A Secretariat in the Privy Council Office would be established to support the Committee and oversee the development of the National Security Strategy and the implementation of policy decisions while a Joint Committee of the House of Commons and the Senate would be brought into being to provide parliamentary oversight of national security issues.

A HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

A strategic framework for homeland security would also be developed under the direction of the National Security Committee of Cabinet using the same ends, ways and means format as the NSS. An outline framework is included at Table 1.

ENDS	WAYS	MEANS
<p>MAINTENANCE OF:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The safety, security and well-being of Canadian citizens, critical infrastructure and the natural environment; • Excellent relations with the United States <p>In the face of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Missile attack • Cyber-attack • Terrorism involving conventional or non-conventional weapons • Transnational criminal activity • Natural or man-made disaster 	<p>PREVENT</p> <p>Diminish the threat</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Generally, act at home and abroad, using all the elements of national power to resolve, or contribute to the resolution of, those issues that give rise to threats to the homeland. • Specifically, in the international arena, act to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ promote democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and freedoms ◦ help contain or normalize relations with "states of concern" ◦ help resolve conflict and restore and maintain peace in those regions of the world having strong links to ethnic communities in Canada (eg, Indian sub-continent, and the Middle east) ◦ help stop the further proliferation of CBRN weapons technology • In the domestic arena, act to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ prevent individuals from illegally entering or exiting Canada ◦ prevent the entry to Canada of immigrants with criminal or terrorist associations ◦ expel from Canada non-citizens convicted of serious crimes ◦ prevent the fraudulent acquisition of Canadian citizenship and travel documents ◦ prevent or impede residents of Canada from raising funds or providing logistical support to terrorist groups ◦ promote the integration of immigrants with the broader established community ◦ provide law enforcement agencies with the legislation and resources needed to battle transnational criminal activity <p>Deter or Dissuade Attackers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the face of the threat of missile or terrorist attack, support the maintenance of a U.S. deterrent capability including long-range strike forces and endorse its use when appropriate • Enhance the efficacy of national security agencies with a view to dissuading terrorist or organized criminals from targeting Canada or using it as a base of operations for assaults on the U.S. <p>PROTECT</p> <p>Diminish vulnerability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote and implement design, procedural and physical security measures with a view to reducing the susceptibility of critical infrastructure to destruction or disruption • Enhance the efficacy of national consequence management 	<p>STRUCTURE</p> <p>AGENCIES</p> <p>PERSONNEL</p> <p>POLICY</p> <p>DOCTRINE</p> <p>PLANS</p> <p>TRAINING</p> <p>MATERIAL</p> <p>FUNDING</p>

	<p>agencies with a view to minimizing the effects of attack</p> <p>Maintain Surveillance, Detect and Warn</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintain and enhance where necessary the surveillance, detection and warning capabilities of the: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ North American Aerospace Defence Command ◦ Maritime and air components of the Canadian Forces ◦ Canadian Security Intelligence Service ◦ Canadian Coast Guard ◦ Customs and immigration services ◦ Agriculture and public health services <p>Disrupt and Defend</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Act to disrupt planned terrorist attacks before they are launched • Support a U.S. decision to proceed with the development and implementation of a National Missile Defence system <p>RESPOND</p> <p>Manage Crises</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assign responsibility and authority for consequence management to local, provincial and federal civil authorities and law enforcement agencies <p>Manage Consequences</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assign responsibility and authority for consequence management to local, provincial and federal civil authorities and agencies • Offer the assistance of the Armed Forces in a supporting role (Aid to the Civil Power, Assistance to Civil Authorities, Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies) for consequence management <p>PREPARE</p> <p>Organize, Equip, Train and Practice</p> <p>COOPERATE</p> <p>Federally, Provincially & Locally</p> <p>Private and Public Sectors</p> <p>Internationally</p> <p>Bilaterally Canada-U.S.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agree and implement harmonized policies aimed at enforcing a continental security perimeter • Ensure inter-operability of Canadian Forces with their U.S. counterparts • Encourage cooperation between police, customs, immigration and coast guard agencies in the conduct of transnational operations • Share intelligence • Share training facilities and other resources 	
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TABLE 1 – OUTLINE HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

CONCLUSION

While not as acutely as they do others, the non-traditional and asymmetric threats of the 21st century do pose a threat to the safety, security and well being of Canadian citizens, the national infrastructure and the natural environment. Equally important these threats, or more precisely, Canada's failure to address them adequately in the eyes of its neighbour to the south, also pose a danger to a second vital interest – Canada's political, economic and military relationship with the United States. The federal government must reflect on its core task of ensuring the safety and well-being of its citizens and act to fulfill its responsibilities in this regard. Production of a National Security Strategy under the direction of a National Security Committee of Cabinet followed by a specific strategic framework to ensure the security of the homeland would go a long way to improving the effectiveness of government in this regard. Canadians must also remember Prime Minister King's commitment, on their behalf, to "our obligations as a good friendly neighbour, and one of them is to see that, at our instance, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces would not be able to pursue their way, either by land, sea or air to the United States, across Canadian territory." Should we do so, we can assure ourselves and our American allies "that this hemisphere, at least, shall remain a strong citadel wherein civilization can flourish unimpaired."

WORD COUNT = 8543

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